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I
  The Presidency meets 
  the challenges
How could a non-euro country steer the Eu-
ropean Union through the most serious crisis 
that the latter has ever had to face? That was 
the crucial question being asked at the start 
of the Polish Presidency. In retrospect it is 
clear that the Poles made a virtue of necessity 
by adopting the role of mediator between eu-
rozone countries and non-eurozone countries. 
The fact that the “Six-pack,” which is one of the 
accords that is supposed to bring about greater 
fiscal discipline and economic coordination, 
became a joint EU decision and not merely an 
agreement restricted to the eurozone states is 
no doubt due to the perseverance of the Polish 
mediators. This was one of the reasons why the 
young Polish administration was seen in a posi-
tive light. A new member state is usually con-
fronted with an anxious question when it takes 
over the EU Presidency for the first time. “Are 
they up to the job?” The Poles were certainly 
up to the job, and, more to the point, it was 
something they liked doing. It meant more to 
them than policymaking and bureaucracy. The 
parliamentary elections in the middle of the 
Presidency returned the governing coalition to 
power and showed that Poland was internally 
stable and a pro-European country.
Croatia, Belarus and Ukraine loomed large in 
the area of foreign policy. Thus the EU and 
Croatia have brought the accession process 
to a successful conclusion. On the other hand, 
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A new member state is usually confronted with an anxious question when 
it takes over the EU Presidency for the first time. “Are they up to the job?” 
At the end of the Polish Presidency one can heave a sigh of relief and say 
that they are certainly up to the job. And, more to the point, it is something 
they like doing. The new Poland is strong in economic terms, politically 
stable and pro-European.s
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there has been little or no progress with regard 
to the Eastern Partnership, which means a lot 
to the Poles. The situation in Belarus continues 
to be difficult, and it is unclear what the out-
come will be. The same is true of Ukraine. The 
negotiations on a new association agreement 
have been completed, but it has not as yet been 
initialled. Everything depends on the political 
development in the country.
The decision to establish a European founda-
tion for the support of democracy, the European 
Endowment for Democracy, which was taken at 
the final meeting of the EU Council, certainly 
came as a positive surprise.
The highest representatives of the EU and of 
the Presidency cooperated rather smoothly. 
The van Rompuy/Tusk tandem and the Ashton/
Sikorski duo did not give rise to a great deal 
of speculation, which may have been due to 
the absence of friction and/or to a high level of 
professionalism.
Critics have pointed out that it proved impos-
sible to extend the Schengen Area to cover 
Bulgaria and Romania. Here the EU Presidency 
clearly reached its limits. Whilst it would be 
true to say that the new EU member states 
have made a great deal of progress with regard 
to the security of the EU’s external borders, the 
internal states still do not have a great deal of 
confidence in them, and this mistrust is fre-
quently exacerbated by right-wing populists.
  The Euro crisis and 
its consequences
Within the enlarged EU the Polish Presidency 
has accelerated the convergence process. The 
erstwhile division between the old west and 
the new east no longer reflects the realities of 
the European Union. This was already apparent 
in 2008–9 during the economic crisis. The new 
EU member states in general and the Baltic   
republics in particular, which were hit hard by 
the financial crisis in 2008–9, have managed 
to weather the storm and a double-digit plunge 
in the economy, and have returned to the path   
of growth.
Poland is the only country which has come out 
of the recent economic and financial crisis with 
positive levels of growth. However, this state of 
affairs has led to a situation in which there is 
no longer a great desire to join the eurozone. In 
the current crisis many experts perceive the 
advantages of flexible exchange rates. When 
it comes to the new EU member states (and if 
we exclude Cyprus and Malta), only Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Estonia have joined the eurozone. 
All the others are waiting for the stabilization 
of the euro and the implementation of the in-
ternal EU reforms. Although Poland has not 
yet said when it will join the eurozone, leading 
Polish politicians have made it clear that it in-
tends to adopt the common currency. The com-
ing months will show what kind of role Poland 
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can play in the new EU that will be dominated 
by the fiscal union.
II
Poland’s Future Role
The prestige that accrued in the course of the 
Polish Presidency should be utilized in the   
negotiations on the new intergovernmental 
treaty and the forthcoming EU budget. Moreo-
ver, the Danish Presidency (Denmark is not an 
a eurozone country) will show how and to what 
extent the difficult relationship between the 
eurozone countries and the rest of the EU can 
be dealt with in the reforms that lie ahead. And 
during the Danish Presidency the reforms that 
were given the go-ahead at the last EU summit 
in December 2011 will have to be incorporated 
into some kind of legal framework. This pro-
vides Poland with an excellent opportunity to 
demonstrate that it is a politically stable and 
prosperous country that inserted a debt brake 
(which caps public debt at 55 % of GDP) into 
its constitution a decade ago. One of the main 
reasons why Polish voters re-elected the Tusk 
government at the parliamentary elections 
in October 2011 was its pro-European stance.   
After the confusion of the Kaczynski period, 
Tusk has convinced the EU that Poland is now 
making a positive contribution. Electoral sur-
veys show that many Poles would like to see 
their country playing the same kind of role as 
Germany and France. In order to attain this 
goal Poland will have to emphasize its determi-
nation to join the eurozone as soon as the new 
EU and a stable euro have materialized. And 
this would demonstrate that it is indeed capa-
ble of playing a leadership role. 
Can the Weimar Triangle  
become the new EU engine?
Since Britain has deliberately chosen to re-
treat to the sidelines in the new EU, a strate-
gic question arises. Can Poland team up with 
the Franco-German duo, and can Poland as-
sume a leadership role within the EU? This 
option seems feasible on account of Poland’s 
economic strength and political stability, the 
pro-European stance of the electorate, and the 
growing competitiveness of the Polish econo-
my. At the beginning of 2011 Polish President   
Komorowski  attempted  to  breathe  new  life 
into the Weimar Triangle by inviting Chancel-
lor Merkel and President Sarkozy to a summit 
meeting in Warsaw.
In 2011 celebrations marked the twentieth   
anniversary of the Weimar Triangle. However, 
it has not played a pivotal role in the ongoing   
efforts to reform the EU. At a joint meeting on 
21st June 2011 the German and Polish govern-
ments decided to deepen German-Polish coop-
eration in the area of European policymaking 
and to integrate the Weimar Triangle into this 
process. Yet a triangle clearly has three sides, 
and hitherto the French reactions have been 
lukewarm at best. However, in recent years 
there have been several foreign policy initia-
tives, including those launched by the three 
foreign ministers and their counterparts from 
Ukraine and Russia. In the course of the Polish 
Presidency the Franco-Polish relationship be-
gan to deteriorate on account of the fact that 
Sarkozy’s plans for saving the euro extended 
only to the 17 members of the eurozone, and 
excluded the other EU states. In contrast to Ger-
many, France has never been very keen about 
greater Polish involvement in the leadership of 
the EU. Furthermore, the attempts to overcome 
the euro crisis have shown that the Franco-Ger-
man engine is strong enough when it comes to 
working out viable compromises. However, if 
there is growing pressure within the EU, the 
“Merkozy” duo will have to find a new European 
supporter. But when all is said and done, Paris 
will not make its position clear before the presi-
dential elections in the summer of 2012. 
Some people believe that these elections will 
decide the fate of the EU, for they overlap with 
the establishment of its new EMS safety net. 
So far the “Merkozy” duo has provided the 
EU with the requisite leadership, though even 
a year ago their personal differences seemed 
irreconcilable. In the EU 28 a Franco-German-
Polish trio could do the strategic planning and 
determine the policy areas, the issues and the 
agendas of current political life and of crisis 
management initiatives.s
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Poland and the economic 
and financial crisis
Poland’s growing influence in Europe is due to 
its positive economic development and its polit-
ical stability. There are several reasons for the 
resilience of the Polish economy in the midst 
of the crisis, though there are different ways of 
assessing their relative importance. First, it is 
a fact that the Polish capital market, unlike the 
other European markets, remained stable. The 
reason for this was the conservative lending 
policies espoused by the Polish banks.
Second, the Polish internal market is quite 
large, and the catch-up process has not as yet 
come to an end. For this reason the drop in   
exports during the 2008–2009 crisis was made 
up for by domestic demand. And then there 
was the flexible labour market, which enabled 
companies to react to the changed situation in 
a pragmatic manner.
Third, the government’s strategy on monetary 
and currency policy was a success. Moreover, 
the EU financial transfers came in useful and 
helped Poland to modernize its outdated infra-
structure. However, the fact that the situation 
has developed in a positive way in the recent 
past does not mean that this is a state of affairs 
which will continue indefinitely. The opening   
of the German labour market in May 2011 
did not lead to a noticeable increase in labour 
migration, and this suggests that the Polish 
labour market is becoming less flexible. Fur-
thermore, the Tusk government has not as yet 
introduced important measures such as the 
stabilization of public finances, or the reform 
of the pension and health insurance system in 
the agricultural sector.
Finally, over the next decade Poland will have 
to meet the challenges of demographic change, 
which will have a profound effect on the educa-
tional sector and the labour market. The baby 
boom of 1980's was followed in the 1990's by 
a period with low birth rates, and those who 
were born at that time are now entering the 
labour market. This and labour migration mean 
that Poland in the years ahead will be confront-
ed with a lack of skilled workers.
The modernization drive in Poland is in full 
swing. It constitutes an opportunity that is not 
to be missed. The European Football Cham-
pionship in the summer of 2012, which is   
being staged jointly with Ukraine, will show in 
symbolic terms what has been achieved so far.   
Virtually all of the stadiums have been com-
pleted, but the same cannot be said of the   
infrastructure. It remains to be seen whether 
the  organizational  talent  of  the  Poles  and 
Ukrainians will enable them to make up for the 
infrastructure deficiencies. Over and above this 
the success or otherwise of the Polish economy   
depends  on  whether  or  not  it  manages  to   
become part of the global division of labour.   
It is also worth mentioning the steady increase 
in  Polish  imports  and  exports  within  the   
European internal market. In this context trade 
between Germany and Poland is especially   
important. Since Poland became a member of 
the EU it has become Germany’s most impor-
tant eastern trading partner, and the moderni-
zation of the Polish economy is directly linked 
to the boom in German exports. This shows 
that the economies of both states are reaping 
the benefits of Europeanization. 
III
Conclusions
In  the  course  of  the  past  twelve  months 
“Merkozy” have come to understand that they 
need each other. This is a reflection of the fact 
that Germany and France have a vested inter-
est in the EU, and this is of far greater impor-
tance than the personalities and predilections 
of their leading politicians. 
Part of this process is the convergence of po-
sitions that had previously been stated in a 
more or less fundamentalist manner. The new 
creed, which came about partly as a result of 
massive pressure exerted by the markets, is 
consolidation AND coordination. In the final 
analysis what is at issue is the need to over-
come the weaknesses of EMU. The upshot of 
all this is that the convergence process with-
in the EU continues to forge ahead unabated.   s
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Where does Poland stand with regard to this 
process? On the one hand the country is doing 
rather well in economic terms. On the other 
hand further reforms are necessary in order 
to ensure that it will have a sustainable future.   
Today, now that debt relief for Greece is immi-
nent, hardly anyone remembers the fact that 
twenty years ago debt relief amounting to more 
than US $ 20 billion formed the basis for eco-
nomic reform in Poland. Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk has a closer relationship with the 
German Chancellor than with the French Pres-
ident. Moreover, the Polish economy is closer 
to the German economy than to the French 
economy. For twenty years Poland has been im-
mersed in an ongoing transformation process. 
On several occasions in the recent past Poland 
and Germany have been called upon to demon-
strate political and economic solidarity. Over the 
past ten years France has not implemented the   
reforms which Germany adopted during Ger-
hard Schröder’s chancellorship. These includ-
ed a reduction in government expenditure, 
changes in the health insurance system, and 
the introduction of the Hartz IV social security 
system. The reforms began in earnest only four 
years ago, when Sarkozy became president. His 
re-election is not a foregone conclusion. These 
factors mean that Poland’s experiences relating 
to the introduction of reforms are becoming 
increasingly important as far as the other EU 
member states are concerned. And they suggest 
that it is possible to learn from Poland. After the 
success of the Polish Presidency and the com-
pletion of the EU restructuring process, there is 
a growing likelihood that in the future Poland 
will play a more important role in the European 
Union. The fact that it inserted a debt brake in 
its constitution ten years ago speaks for itself. 
Germany and other EU states are hoping to   
introduce  this  important  economic  policy   
instrument in the near future.
A symbol of Poland’s transformation was the 
speech (see link) given in Berlin by Foreign 
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski on 28th November 
2011. It  was  noteworthy  because  he  called 
on Germany to take the lead in Europe and 
The new Weimar Triangle?
Sources: European Commission, Eurostat, GUS © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Statistics on international trade between Poland, the EU, Germany and France
January – December 2010
Volume of trade
in billions of €
Volume of Trade 
in billions of €
PL – DE  :
PL – FR :
PL – EU  :
DE  – FR :
67.19
13.59
189.19
150.10
37.70 5.99
29.49 7.60
63.25
86.85
99.78 89.42
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because he said that Poland feared German 
power less than German inactivity. This was 
a remarkable U-turn, for as recently as 2006 
Sikorski had compared Russo-German coopera-
tion and the construction of the Baltic pipeline 
with the Hitler-Stalin Pact. The Polish example 
shows that when it comes to reforms within 
the EU and reforms related to the euro, the is-
sue is not in the first instance the question of 
sovereign debt. It is primarily about trust and 
solidarity in Europe. And it is about enhanc-
ing the competitiveness of the member states.   
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Solidarity and assistance are a sine qua non, 
but in the final analysis one’s own efforts are 
of decisive importance. The euro crisis is above 
all a crisis of trust that affects the institutions 
of the eurozone. The development of Poland 
over the past twenty years is an outstanding 
example of how Europe can deal with this kind 
of problem. Without the EU and European soli-
darity Poland would not now be a prosperous 
country, and without a Polish EU Presidency 
the word “solidarity” would not have quite the 
same meaning. 
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